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LAWSUIT. By Stuart M. Speiser. New York: Horizon Press.
1980. Pp. v, 617. $40; paper $12.50.

The size of tort damages awards and their impact on industry
have increased phenomenally in the twentieth century. After the
1974 crash of a DC-10 outside Orly Airport in Paris, for example,
Turkish Airlines and its insurers paid a total of $62,268,750 to settle
340 wrongful death actions. The trend toward ever-larger awards
and settlements has alarmed many observers and resulted in a
number of proposals for reform. As long ago as 1880, Professor
Thomas M. Cooley suggested a $5000 limit on compensatory damages for wrongful death; 1 more recently, other commentators have
endorsed similar ceilings2 and revisions in the contingent fee system. 3 Whether one views the trend as good or bad, however, depends on one's perspective. From the perspective of Stuart Speiser,
an aviation tort law specialist and a practicing plaintiffs' attorney,
larger and more frequent judgments should be encouraged because
they provide one of the few effective checks on corporate abuse of
individual rights.
In his most recent book, Lawsuit, Speiser draws upon his extensive experience in aviation tort litigation to construct a defense of the
personal injury bar and the contingent fee system. Without contingent fees, Speiser argues, many injuries would go unredressed and a
valuable deterrent to irresponsible business practices would be lost.
The "entrepreneur-lawyer,"4 he claims, has become a vital link in

I. T. COOLEY, A. TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 274 (1880).
2. See, e.g., Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lollery: Compensation and Selective Reim•

bursement, 53 VA. L. REv. 774, 798-802 (1967).
3. Legal scholars have debated many of the questions surrounding the contingent fee system. See, e.g., F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964). But Lowsult
is addressed primarily to the layman.
4. The "entrepreneur-lawyer'' is the tort lawyer who is willing to incur substantial costs in
advance of trial in exchange for a contingent fee. Pp. 144-54.
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the remedial process: If lawyers were unwilling to invest their time
and money to pursue large contingent fees, few individuals could
afford to sue big corporations.
Speiser develops this thesis largely through accounts of important
cases. He recounts, for example, the procedural gymnastics performed by General Motors against Ralph Nader in the labyrinthine
New York court system. Had Nader been paying hourly attorneys'
fees, Speiser argues, General Motors would have attempted to exhaust his resources by further delaying the trial. Under the contingent fee system, corporate defendants are less able to wear down
their opponents because many plaintiffs' lawyers will advance the
costs of expensive litigation. By preserving meritorious lawsuits and
prolonging the attendant adverse publicity, therefore, the contingent
fee system makes corporate defendants more willing to settle. 5 This
process, as well as the prospect of substantial awards, 6 has enabled
entrepreneur-lawyers to deter the marketing of an inestimable
number of unsafe products (pp. 342-45).
The contingent fee system, Speiser posits, has magnified the deterrent effect of litigation on manufacturers not only by increasing
plaintiffs' stamina, but also by improving the quality of the plaintiffs'
bar. Until recently, tort plaintiffs were often represented by poorly
prepared lawyers who depended on volume for an adequate income,
and opposed by defense attorneys who were paid by the hour and
unconcerned with the cost of trial preparation. A significant portion
of the plaintiffs' bar, Speiser believes, has become "scientific" in its
use of sophisticated evidence, exhaustive investigative techniques,
and expert witnesses (p. 560). "Scientific" trial preparation, however, can be enormously expensive. Without the incentive of large
contingent fees, lawyers would be unwilling or unable to undertake
and prepare properly risky products liability suits. By contributing
to the preparedness of plaintiffs' attorneys, Speiser maintains, these
large fees have promoted compensation and deterrence (pp. 341-48).
Although Speiser's argument is credible, it is weakened by his
overbroad and sometimes unsupported statements. He asserts, for
example, that "[m]illions of people have been and will be spared serious injuries or death because of the deterrent effect of litigation on
manufacturers" (p. 343). He provides no support for this claim or
for his conclusion that "[o]nly the threats oflarge money judgments
5. According to Speiser, General Motors eventually settled the Nader case when it realized
that negative press coverage of each new development in the litigation was producing a net loss
from continued defense. Pp. 99-100.
6. Speiser points, for example, to the award of $125 million in punitive damages in one
Ford Pinto case. The punitive damage award was eventually reduced by the trial judge on
remittitur. Ford refused to pay even the $3.5 million reduced award, but the judgment was
upheld on appeal. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 357, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981).
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and loss of cheap insurance coverage have brought safety progress in
most American industries" (p. 348). The assumptions underlying
Speiser's argument - that the threat of liability can alter the behavior of corporate managers and that injuries result from defects that
were known to those managers and correctable at a reasonable cost
- are not universally accepted, but he makes no attempt to justify
them.
In his eagerness to praise the tort liability system, moreover,
Speiser overlooks a number of fundamental defects. Many plaintiffs
go uncompensated while others receive astronomical awards; the
system is painfully slow and expensive to administer; and lawyers
may often be the big winners. 7 Speiser fails to mention that in many
cases, liability is unchallenged and attorneys can hardly be said to
earn their contingent fees. Thus, while Lawsuit may serve a valuable
role in rehabilitating the public's opinion of plaintiffs' attorneys,
many readers will find its lack of balance distressing.
Nevertheless, Speiser's book is worth reading. The work lacks
the depth necessary t9 satisfy legal scholars, but its intended audience - the general public - should find it interesting and informative. Unfortunately, Speiser's rambling anecdotal approach,
undoubtedly designed to provide color and hold the reader's attention, may frustrate comprehension of the book's deeper message.
Many pages are devoted to patting the backs of colleagues, self-aggrandizement, and conveying irrelevant information. Despite its
shortcomings, Lawsuit brings a unique perspective to a complex and
misunderstood legal dilemma; although opponents of the contingent
fee system will undoubtedly ask for equal time, Speiser has contributed substantially to the debate. 8

7. See generally Franklin, Stlpra note 2.
8. Speiser's book has also been reviewed by Braun, Book Review, 1981 DET. C. L. REV,
251; Callen, Book Review, 5 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 711 (1980); Cordiano, Book Review, 28
U. KAN. L. REV. 575 (1980); Le Bel, Book Review, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 838 (1981); and Wilkins,
Book Review, 14 AKRON L. REV. 535 (1981).

